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Dino Falaschetti.  Democratic Governance and Economic Performance: How Accountability Goes Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business.  Under contract with Springer.

Dino Falaschetti.  ''Can Lobbying Prevent Anticompetitive Outcomes? Evidence on Consumer Monopsony in Telecommunications.''  Forthcoming in the Journal of Competition Law and Economics.

Dino Falaschetti.  ''When Deficits Make Sense.''  Hoover Digest (2008): 72-75.

Dino Falaschetti and Gary Miller.  ''Constraining Rational Choice: Allocation Versus Efficiency and the Origin of Commitment Problems.''  In Irwin Morris, Joe Oppenheimer, and Karol Soltan (eds.) Politics from Anarchy to Democracy.  Palo Alto: Stanford Law and Politics, 2004.

Dino Falaschetti.  ''Credible Commitments and Investment: Do Checks on the Ability or Incentive for Opportunism Matter?''  Economic Inquiry, 41.4 (2003): 660-674.

Dino Falaschetti.  ''Can Theoretically Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy.'' Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19.1 (2003): 83-105.

Dino Falaschetti.  ''Book review of Usha Haley's Multinational Corporations in Political Environments.''  International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 10.3 (2002): 290-292.

Dino Falaschetti.  ''Golden Parachutes: Credible Commitments or Evidence of Shirking?''  Journal of Corporate Finance, 8.2 (2002): 159-178.

Dino Falaschetti.  ''Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve.''  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18.2 (2002): 488-510.

Dino Falaschetti and Gary Miller.  ''Constraining Leviathan: Moral Hazard and Credible Commitment in Constitutional Design.''  Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13.4 (2001): 389-411.

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